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Huns Th. A .  Bressers 
A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INCENTIVES AND DIRECTIVES: THE CASE OF 
DUTCH WATER QUALITY POLICY 
T h e  Nether lands i s  a small coun t ry ,  approximately the  size o f  Mary land 
and  Delaware combined. Yet, it has much i n d u s t r y  and, w i t h  a populat ion 
o f  some 14  mil l ion people, i t  has one of t he  h ighest  populat ion densit ies in 
the  wor ld .  Criss-crossed w i t h  thousands o f  miles o f  waterways o f  a l l  sizes, 
it i s  also a c o u n t r y  rich in sur face waters. B y  1970, t h e  yea r  the  Pollut ion 
o f  Sur face Waters A c t  went  i n t o  effect, i n d u s t r y  and  p r i v a t e  households 
were p roduc ing  r o u g h l y  45 mil l ions o f  populat ion equivalents'  o f  oxygen-  
consuming organic  po l lu t ion.  As a resul t ,  overa l l  water  qua l i t y  in the  
c o u n t r y  had, in p la in  terms, become rot ten--both f i gu ra t i ve l y  and  l i t e ra l l y !  
B u t  by 1980, organic  po l lu t ion caused by indus t r i a l  p roduc t i on  had  decl ined 
by two- th i rds.  Almost h a l f  o f  t he  remaining organic  pol lut ion, from b o t h  
i n d u s t r y  and  households, was removed in sewage treatment plants, many o f  
which had  been newly built. Everywhere biological ly "dead" waters re-  
v i ved .  In light o f  t h e  resu l t s  achieved, water qua l i t y  po l icy  is regarded in 
The  Nether lands as one o f  t h e  few examples o f  e f fect ive governmental i n te r -  
vent ion (Hoogerwerf,  1985). 
Government i n te rven t ion  can take many forms and  in the  case o f  Du tch  
water qua l i t y  po l icy  many d i f f e r e n t  inst ruments a re  invo lved.  Product ion o f  
col lect ive goods by the  state ( t h e  treatment o f  sewage in p lants  owned by 
local water boards)  has been a major component o f  t h i s  pol icy. In th i s  
art icle, however, I want t o  focus o n  those aspects o f  t he  pol icy  tha t  deal 
w i t h  t h e  regulat ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  water po l lu t ion.  T h i s  regulat ion works 
w i t h  a mix o f  d i f f e r e n t  po l icy  instruments, i nc lud ing  no t  on l y  inst ruments o f  
d i rec t  regulat ion but also the  much-disputed inst rument  o f  i nd i rec t  regula- 
t ion, t he  e f f l uen t  charge. As f a r  as t h e  level o f  charges levied, t he  Du tch  
system o f  e f f l uen t  charges is t he  most substantial in the  wor ld  (Johnson E 
Brown, 1976). 
T h e  use o f  e f f l uen t  charges as an  inst rument  o f  regu la to ry  po l icy  has 
been the  object o f  much dispute, as much in The  Netherlands (Bressers, 
1985) as in the  Un i ted  States (some in te res t i ng  examples f rom the  high 
po in t  o f  t h i s  discussion in the  USA a re :  White, 1976; Majone, 1976; Rose- 
Ackerman, 1977; McSpadden-Wenner, 1978). T h e  con t rove rsy  between 
advocates and  opponents o f  rep lac ing d i rect ives by incent ive strategies in 
var ious f ie lds o f  pub l i c  i n te rven t ion  has always been ra the r  heated, though 
ca r r i ed  o n  more in terms o f  t heo ry  than  empir ical evidence d rawn  from ex- 
perience w i t h  charges in actual operation (cf. Mitnick, 1980, pp. 373-383). 
Much l i k e  permi t  t rad ing,  a n  incent ive approach actual ly  used in t h e  Uni ted 
States, regu la to ry  e f f l uen t  charges in T h e  Nether lands more o r  tess 
"sneaked in t h r o u g h  t h e  back door" (Oates, 1983). T h e  Du tch  system o f  
It is also one o f  t he  oldest systems in operation. 
The author is  grateful to D r .  Kenneth IIanf for his valuable help with the 
translation of this article, 
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water qua l i t y  charges had  o r ig ina l l y  been designed t o  fulfill a revenue 
ra is ing funct ion.  Indeed, until t he  publ icat ion (Bressers, 1983) o f  t he  
resul ts  o f  t he  research o n  the  actual operation o f  t h i s  system o f  charges 
repor ted o n  in t h i s  art icle, many environmental organizations, po l i t ica l  
part ies and  s tudents o f  environmental po l icy  (especial ly lawyers) ,  doubted 
whether these e f f l uen t  charges had any regu la to ry  ef fect  a t  all. 2 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF DUTCH WATER QUALITY POLICY 
In an  effort t o  combat po l lu t ion at  t h e  source, t he  1970 Pollut ion o f  
Surface Waters A c t  p roh ib i t s  a l l  nonl icensed discharges i n t o  surface waters. 
I nd i rec t  po l lu ters ,  those d i scha rg ing  i n t o  a sewage collector, must meet the  
conditions imposed by municipal i t ies fo r  those hooked up t o  the  collection 
system. In turn, the  municipal i t ies a r e  of ten subject t o  condit ions from the  
water author i t ies  rega rd ing  the  qua l i t y  o f  t h e  sewage tha t  they d ischarge 
in to the  treatment p lan ts  o f  t h e  water boards. In t h e  Netherlands, t h e  
water boards own and  operate the  treatment p lants .  In the  past  decade, an 
enormous e f f o r t  was made t o  expand e f f l uen t  treatment capacity, w i t h  t h e  
resul t  t ha t  t h e  amount o f  organic  po l lu t ion removed from sewages discharges 
increased t o  25 percent  in 1975 and  t o  46 percent  in 1980. T h i s  removal 
rate put T h e  Nether lands more o r  less on  p a r  w i th  i t s  ne ighbor ing coun- 
tr ies. 
The  "pol lu ter  pays"  p r i nc ip le  is t he  basis f o r  t he  e f f l uen t  charges o f  t he  
Pollut ion o f  Sur face Waters Act .  Of f ic ia l ly ,  t h e  sole purpose o f  these 
charges is t o  raise the  money needed t o  f inance sewage treatment measures. 
In view of t h e  ambit ious p rog ram fo r  expanding treatment capacity, these 
charges invo lve large amounts o f  money. In 1971, they generated revenues 
o f  about $30 mill ion; in 1975 approximately $200 mill ion; in 1980 almost $450 
million; and  in 1985, $550 mill ion. 
In T h e  Nether lands each f i r m  has t o  pay  a fee rough ly  accord ing t o  the  
amount o f  po l lu t ion it produces. T h e  amount o f  po l lu t ion i s  calculated in 
pol lut ion u n i t s  cal led "populat ion equivalents." A populat ion equiva lent  i s  
defined as being equiva lent  t o  the  amount o f  organic  po l lu t ion in wastewater 
normally produced by one person. The  fee p e r  po l lu t ion unit rose sha rp l y  
during t h e  pe r iod  the  charge system has been in ef fect  (moving from about 
$6 /un i t  t o  about  $30 /un i t ) .  T h e  fee charged var ies accord ing to  the  reg ion 
w i th in  wh ich  t h e  f i r m  i s  located. These regional d i f ferences a r e  not, 
however, based o n  d i f f e ren t  environmental condi t ions o r  qua l i t y  objectives 
but r a t h e r  re f lect  reg ional ly  d i f f e ren t  costs o f  building and  operat ing 
treatment p lants .  
The  un ique  features o f  The  Netherlands system make it an i n te res t i ng  
example o f  t he  use o f  charges. T h e  Du tch  system o f  e f f l uen t  charges has 
been in operation since 1970 and, in terms o f  t he  level o f  t he  charges, i s  
more than  twice as large as the  comparable German program ( B r o w n  E John- 
son, 1983). B u t  t h e  most d i s t i ngu ish ing  feature o f  t he  Du tch  system i s  
that  i t s  use as a regu la to ry  inst rument  has been "accidental.*' It was not  
intended t o  work  in t h i s  way. Or ig ina l ly ,  t he  charges were to  b e  used t o  
finance t h e  cons t ruc t i on  a n d  operat ion o f  sewage treatment plants. In t h i s  
sense, t h e y  did n o t  replace t h e  of f ic ia l  i n te rven t ion  s t ra tegy o f  d i rec t  
regulat ion. Given th i s  situation, t he  Du tch  case prov ides a un ique oppor- 
tunity t o  examine t h e  ef fects  o f  these two approaches as they were applied 
to  the  same case. It also was possible to  collect f o r  t he  per iod 1975-1980 
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data  on indus rial pollution by  t y p e  of pollution, branch of indus t ry  and 
water d i s t r ic t .  In addition, it was possible to collect information on t h e  
degree  to which different  water authori t ies  employed various types  of policy 
instruments .  On t h e  basis  of t h e s e  d a t a ,  it was possible to draw inferences 
regarding t h e  relative effectiveness of effluent charges  and direct  regula- 
tion based on a number of different  statistical analyses .  
In t h e  following section, t h e  d e g r e e  of  effectiveness, our  dependent  
variable, wil l  b e  defined. In section three ,  w e  will then look a t  t h r e e  
statistical analyses  of t h e  impact o f  t h e  policy instruments  used.  These 
analyses  a r e  supplemented in section four  by  two e x p e r t  assessments  of 
these  impacts. T h e  final section presents  some general  conclusions regard-  
ing t h e  Dutch experience with effluent charges .  
5 ’  
Goal Attainment and  Effectiveness: What has  been accomplished? 
T h e  f i r s t  quest ion to  be  answered empirically regards  t r e n d s  in Dutch 
industrial water pollution dur ing  t h e  period under  investigation. These 
t r e n d s  a r e  examined in relation to  t h e  two most important types  of indus- 
trial water pollution : oxygen-consuming organic pollution measured in PEs 
(so-called population equivalents) and heavy metal pollution. 
In 1975, t h e  year  in which t h e  f i r s t  Multi-Year Indicative Program on 
water pollution control was issued,  Dutch indus t ry  still produced a s tagger-  
ing 19,670,000 population equivalents  (PE) of oxygen-consuming organic  
pollution. This  was substantially more than t h e  pollution produced by  all 
Dutch households together .  By 1980, t h e  end  of t h e  period covered by the  
program, t h e  total amount of industrially produced organic  pollution had 
dropped to  14,331,000 PE. This  represented a reduction of more than five 
million PE, o r  27 percent .  A decrease of roughly th i s  magnitude had been 
projected by t h e  1975 policy program. There  were, however, enormous 
regional differences.  In some a r e a s  (water  board dis t r ic ts)  organic  indus- 
trial pollution had actually increased, whereas in o ther  a reas  th i s  type  of 
pollution had been reduced by  more than one-half. 
The  1975 program had set no explicit t a rge ts  regarding t h e  abatement of 
industrial water pollution with heavy metals. As was t h e  case  with organic 
pollution, there  have also been huge  regional differences in the  amount of 
reduction attained in heavy metal pollution. In general ,  however, it can be 
concluded tha t  industrial pollution with heavy metals has ,  on t h e  whole, 
been reduced by  approximately one-half in t h e  period involved. 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS I :  MULTIPLE TIME SERIES 
Without f u r t h e r  analysis it is not clear whether  these decreases  in indus- 
trial wastewater pollution a r e  in fact t h e  resul ts  of t h e  water quality policy 
pursued  by t h e  government. As is often the  case in evaluating policy, it 
also was not possible in th i s  case to  employ a t ru ly  experimental research 
design in examining this  quest ion.  For th i s  reason, a number of o ther  
methods have been combined to  determine t h e  ex ten t  to  which levels of 
pollution reduction attained can be  a t t r ibu ted  to  t h e  policy measures taken. 
We f i r s t  carr ied out  a time-series analysis of t h e  t r e n d s  in industrial 
wastewater containing biodegradable organic substances.  Until 1970, t h e  
year  in which t h e  water  quality law went into effect, organic industrial 
pollution increased.  Thereaf ter  t h e r e  was a s h a r p ,  continuous decline. 
(see Figure 1 . )  However, even such  evidence of a s t r iking decline does 
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not, in i tse l f ,  p r o v i d e  i ronc lad p roo f  of a causal relat ion between t h e  pol icy  
pu rsued  since 1970 and  t h e  po l l u t i on  reduct ion achieved, t he  more so as the  
pol icy was no t  a b r u p t l y  in t roduced,  but was implemented gradual ly .  Before 
such a re la t ionship can b e  established, it i s  necessary t o  consider alterna- 




Figure  1 
Oxygen-Consuming I n d u s t r i a l  P o l l u t i o n  i n  I n d u s t r i a l  Wastewater (dot ted  l i n e )  
Index Figures on t h e  Amount of I n d u s t r i a l  Product ion ( s o l i d  l i n e )  and 
\ 
3 0 1  
The ex ten t  o f  po l lu t ion i s  obv ious ly  in f luenced by decisions taken b y  the 
indust r ia l  f i rms.  In t h i s  connection, t he  re levant  decisions a re  rega rd ing :  
- t h e  overa l l  level o f  p roduc t i on  ( t o  increase o r  decrease product ion)  
- the  amount o f  po l lu t ion produced p e r  unit o f  product ion ( t o  p roduce  
The f i r m  may decide t o  reduce p roduc t i on  because the  costs o f  water qual i-  
ty contro l  a r e  so high tha t  maintaining t h e  present  level o f  p roduc t i on  i s  
not prof i tab le.  A 1972 D u t c h  Centra l  Planning Agency s t u d y  concluded tha t  
product ion level in 1983 would b e  4.5 percent  less due t o  t h e  d i rec t  and  
ind i rect  costs o f  water qua l i t y  po l icy .  It is, however, be t te r  t o  b e  cautious 
in th i s  r e g a r d  and  t o  a t t r i b u t e  any  change in the  level o f  product ion no t  t o  
water qua l i t y  po l icy  but instead t o  such factors  as economic recession, 
making p roduc t i on  decl ine a n  a l ternat ive explanation fo r  t he  pol lu t ion de- 
cline observed. 
F igu re  1 shows that, in fact, t he  volume o f  product ion did no t  decline, 
not  even in the  recessionary per iod o f  1975-1980. A t  t he  same time, 
w i t h  more o r  less pol lu t ion) .  
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however, t he re  was a dramatic decrease in pol lu t ion between 1970 and  1975, 
a time when t h e  economy was booming. I f  we look at  t h e  separate branches 
o f  i n d u s t r y ,  in o r d e r  t o  make su re  t h a t  t h i s  overa l l  decrease in pol lu t ion i s  
no t  the resu l t  o f  a decl ine in p roduc t i on  in some o f  t he  heavi ly  po l l u t i ng  
indust r ies,  we find tha t  t he re  a re  on ly  a few indus t r i es  tha t  have exper i -  
enced a decrease in product ion.  Even i f  we assume tha t  any  decrease in 
po l l u t i on  leads d i r e c t l y  t o  a propor t ionate reduct ion in pol lu t ion (an  ove r l y -  
opt imis t ic  assumption! ) , t h e  p roduc t i on  decreases in these indus t r i es  would 
resu l t  in a decrease in total oxygen-consuming indus t r i a l  po l lu t ion o f  on l y  2 
t o  3 pe rcen t  as compared w i t h  t h e  actual ly  recorded ove ra l l  decl ine o f  27 
percent .  A similar s i tuat ion can b e  found w i t h  rega rd  t o  po l lu t ion w i th  
heavy metals. Given the  fact  t h a t  p roduc t i on  has, o n  the  whole, tended t o  
increase instead o f  decline, we can conclude tha t  po l lu t ion p e r  p r o d u c t  unit 
has decreased more sharp ly  than  total po l lu t ion and  tha t  t he  level o f  pol lu- 
t i on  p e r  p r o d u c t  unit has decreased more sha rp l y  than  total po l lu t ion and  
tha t  t he  level o f  po l lu t ion reduc t i on  at ta ined tends t o  underestimate the  
effect iveness o f  water qua l i t y  po l icy .  
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 2: 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Theoretical ly, changes in pol lu t ion p e r  p r o d u c t  unit might  v e r y  well b e  
accounted f o r  by o the r  factors  apa r t  from pol icy  outputs .  Before we can 
say a n y t h i n g  about  t h e i r  re la t i ve  inf luence, we must f i r s t  l i s t  t he  d i f f e ren t  
k inds  o f  factors  tha t  may have an impact o n  p e r  unit pol lu t ion.  We have 
const ructed such an  i n v e n t o r y  us ing  f i v e  dimensions o f  decision making in 
the  mode o f  t he  "subject ive ly  rat ional actor" (Hennipman, 1945; cf. Simon, 
1955). F i g u r e  2 p rov ides  a n  overv iew o f  these dimensions and  t h e  alterna- 
t i v e  explanations avai lable t o  account fo r  reduct ions in p e r  unit po l lu t ion.  
Below we p resen t  a summary of t h e  conclusions reached by app ly ing  Michael 
Scr iven 's  "modus operandi" method (Scr iven,  1976) to t he  examination o f  
these d i f f e r e n t  factors. 
T h e  conclusions d r a w n  f rom t h i s  analysis o f  a l ternat ive explanations al l  
po in t  cons is tent ly  in the  same d i rec t i on :  the factors  considered cannot in 
themselves account fo r  t he  amount o f  po l lu t ion reduct ion attained. They  
wil l, however, t end  t o  f u r t h e r  o r  impede the  impact o f  water qua l i t y  po l icy  
on  the  amount o f  po l lu t ion produced. "Environmental ly f r i end ly "  techno- 
logical developments (see Ila,l' F i g u r e  2 )  do  no t  j us t  appear ou t  o f  nowhere. 
Since o t h e r  factors  have always g i v e n  t h e  impulse for such developments, 
t hey  cannot themselves b e  viewed as an  independent cause o f  po l lu t ion 
abatement levels. However, technological development can sometimes b e  
indispensable fo r  t h e  real izat ion o f  t he  abatement tha t  companies, f o r  o the r  
reasons ( such  as in response t o  po l icy  measures), deemed necessary. In 
the  case o f  heavy metal pol lut ion, developments w i t h  respect t o  the  p r i ce  of 
these materials cannot account fo r  t he  amount o f  abatement achieved since, 
in the  pe r iod  u n d e r  investigation, these pr ices decl ined instead o f  r i s i n g  
(see "b," F i g u r e  2 ) .  It i s  un l i ke l y  tha t  t he  environmental awareness of 
i ndus t r i a l  leaders and  t h e  populat ion in general (see "c and  d," F i g u r e  21 
has been an independent cause of po l lu t ion abatement, among other  reasons 
because o f  t h e  " logic o f  col lect ive action" (Olson, 1971). B u t  it i s  con- 
ceivable tha t  t h e  ex ten t  t o  which and  t h e  ra te  a t  which pol icy  leads to  
resu l t s  wi l l  b e  in f luenced by the  level o f  environmental awareness. In 
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addition, t he  impact o f  in format ion p rov ided  by nongovernmental bodies 
regard ing abatement measure (see "e," F igu re  2 )  should b e  considered 
marginal (supplement ing o the r  factors) .  In format ion i s  necessary but in 
i tse l f  h a r d l y  eve r  suf f ic ient  f o r  companies t o  decide t o  reduce pol lu t ion.  
This  i s  so because these measures usual ly  lead to  h i g h e r  product ion costs. 
F i g u r e  2 
I n v e n t o r y  of  A l t e r n a t i v e  Exp lana t ions  o f  Reduct ions i n  P o l l u t i o n  pe r  Produce U n i t  
Deci s i  onmaki ng dimension A1 t e r n a t i v e  e x p l a n a t o r y  f a c t o r  
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
new b e h a v i o r a l  a1 t e r n a t i v e s  a. independent t e c h n i c a l  devel  opments 
fewer a1 t e r n a t i v e s  
change i n  p r o p e r t i e s  of  a l t e r n a t i v e s  b. i nc rease  v a l u e  waste m a t t e r  as raw 
m a t e r i a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  
c. i nc rease  environmental  awareness w i t h  
change i n  v a l u a t i o n  of p r o p e r t i e s  of  d. i nc rease  environmental  awareness w i t h  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  companies 
i n f o r m a t i o n  on presence and p r o p e r t i e s  e. i n f o r m a t i o n  g i v e n  by nongovernment 
of  a1 t e r n a t i v e s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
CONCLUSIONS 
A f te r  t he  Water Pol lut ion A c t  had  gone i n t o  effect, po l lu t ion o f  Du tch  
i ndus t r i a l  wastewater sha rp l y  decreased, no t  on l y  in t h e  in i t ia l  period, 
when simple and  cheap abatement methods could b e  applied, but also later, 
when t h e  costs o f  abatement measures were h ighe r .  Time series analyses, 
supplemerited by analyses us ing  the  "modus operandi" method, p rov ide  
suppor t  f o r  t he  conclusion tha t  t he  level o f  po l lu t ion reduct ion achieved can 
be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the  pol icy  pu rsued .  The  answer t o  the  main quest ion o f  
th is  paper, i.e. which pol icy  inst ruments have had  the greatest  e f fect  on  
the abatement o f  po l lu t ion in indus t r i a l  wastewater, obv ious ly  depends on  
determining, f i r s t  of all, how impor tant  po l icy  as such has been in bringing 
about a reduc t i on  in indus t r i a l  water pol lut ion. If t he  empir ical ly observed 
decrease in pol lu t ion cannot b e  accounted f o r  by other  factors, t hen  it 
would seem, logical ly speaking, t ha t  po l icy  measures taken must account fo r  
it. As t h e  n e x t  sections wi l l  demonstrate, t h i s  has indeed been the  case in 
The Netherlands. T h e  substant ia l  reduct ion in indus t r i a l  wastewater pol lu- 
t ion has been t h e  resu l t  o f  Du tch  water  qua l i t y  po l icy .  Since tha t  pol icy 
contains a "mix" o f  d i f f e r e n t  measures, t he  questions remains as t o  which o f  
t he  var ious inst ruments appl ied has con t r i bu ted  most t o  the  pol icy's appar- 
ent  effect iveness. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 1 : 
A S T A T I S T I C A L  ASSESSMENT 
In t h e  p rev ious  section we noted tha t  t he re  have been substantial re- 
gional d i f ferences in the  ex ten t  t o  which the  pol icy  objectives have been 
achieved. However, these d i f ferences cannot, wi thout  f u r t h e r  investigation, 
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b e  expla ined by t h e  ex ten t  t o  which the  i nd i v idua l  water boards appl ied the  
var ious pol icy  inst ruments a t  t h e i r  disposal. F i r s t  o f  all, t he  water d is-  
t r i c t s  themselves v a r y  g r e a t l y  in size and  t h u s  in pol lu t ion loads. A long 
w i th  17 ra the r  large d i s t r i c t s ,  t he re  were, during the  research period, 23 
o f  r a t h e r  small area. In 1975, 97 pe rcen t  o f  t he  total volume o f  organic  
po l lu t ion was p roduced  in these 17 large d i s t r i c t s .  Since the  percentage 
decreases in pol lu t ion o f ten  reached extreme values in the  23 smaller areas, 
based, however, o n  on ly  a few observations ( f i rms) ,  these areas have been 
exc luded from t h e  analysis repo r ted  below. The  impact o f  developments in 
these d i s t r i c t s  o n  t h e  resu l t s  o f  t he  analysis would have been ou t  o f  p ro -  
po r t i on  t o  t h e i r  actua l  importance. 
Di f ferences in goal attainment among the  remaining areas can b e  account- 
ed f o r  by two sets o f  factors. On  t h e  one hand, they can b e  p a r t l y  ex- 
p la ined in terms o f  d i f ferences in t h e  economic s t r u c t u r e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  water 
d i s t r i c t s  w i t h  rega rd  t o  t h e  re la t ive weight o f  pa r t i cu la r  branches o f  indus- 
t ry .  In the  case o f  heavy metal pol lut ion, d i f ferences in abatement levels 
may b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  re la t i ve  share o f  var ious metals in the  total volume 
o f  po l lu t ion.  Us ing  data on  the  share o f  d i f f e ren t  branches o f  i n d u s t r y  in 
the  regional economy and, fo r  heavy metals, t h e  share o f  var ious sub- 
stances in the  regional po l lu t ion in 1975, and  on  t h e  average decrease in 
pol lu t ion p e r  i n d u s t r y  and  substance in The  Netherlands between 1975 and  
1980, the  amount o f  po l lu t ion decrease tha t  could b e  expected on  the  basi 
o f  t he  s t r u c t u r e  o f  regional economy was calculated fo r  each water d i s t r i c t .  
T h i s  expected va lue was closely corre la ted to actual decrease o f  pol lut ion. 
In the  case o f  organic  po l lu t ion the  Pearson's r was +.79 ( r Z  = .62) and  in 
the  case o f  heavy metals po l lu t ion it was +.74 ( r Z  = .55 ) .  
4 
Ef f l uen t  Charges and  Branch  Di f ferences in Pollut ion Decrease 
In 7969, the  f i r s t  t ime organic  po l lu t ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater was 
measured by indus t r i a l  branch,  it was determined tha t  four teen indus t r i es  
accounted fo r  90 percent  o f  t h i s  po l lu t ion.  These four teen indust r ies form 
the  research u n i t s  in the  analysis descr ibed below. Since they accounted 
f o r  such a large p a r t  o f  t he  pol lut ion, t h i s  analysis i s  no t  so much a sample 
s t u d y  but r a t h e r  a semipopulation s tudy .  Nevertheless, in view o f  t h e  
small number o f  u n i t s  involved, a word  o f  caution is in o rde r  when d raw ing  
conclusions based o n  t h i s  sample o f  indust r ies.  
There  a re  a number o f  factors  tha t  could account fo r  t he  d i f ferences 
found  between these indus t r i es  w i t h  rega rd  to  the  pe rcen t  o f  decrease in 
t h e i r  organic  pol lut ion. Most obviously, decreases o r  increases in the  level 
o f  p roduc t i on  o f  t he  d i f f e r e n t  i ndus t r i es  could af fect  t he  volume o f  po l lu t ion 
produced in the  pe r iod  u n d e r  investigation. A second cause o f  d i f ferences 
in abatement ra tes can b e  found  in the  fact  t ha t  in a pa r t i cu la r  i n d u s t r y  it 
i s  much more difficult, and  t h u s  more expensive, to p roduce  more "cleanly" 
t han  it is in another i n d u s t r y .  Therefore, in addi t ion to  the  increase o r  
decrease in production, re la t i ve  abatement costs can p lay  an  impor tant  role 
in determin ing the  level o f  po l lu t ion reduct ion achieved. F ina l ly  and  ( i n  
connection w i t h  t h e  focus of t h i s  s tudy )  most importantly, it i s  also con- 
ceivable t h a t  e f f l uen t  charges could lead t o  d i f ferences in abatement be- 
tween indust r ies.  T h e  more pol lu t ion u n i t s  p e r  unit o f  product ion va lue 
tha t  a r e  caused by an  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  g rea te r  t he  impact t ha t  t he  charges 
wil l  have  o n  p roduc t i on  costs. T h i s  can mean tha t  some indus t r i es  wi l l  bear 
charges tha t  a r e  s ign i f icant ly  g rea te r  t han  other  indust r ies.  E f fo r t s  t o  
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reduce t h e  number o f  po l lu t ion u n i t s  produced w i l l  b e  g rea te r  t o  the  ex ten t  
that  a g i v e n  i n d u s t r y  is l iable f o r  h i g h e r  charges compared t o  i t s  produc-  
t ion value. In t h e  discussion tha t  follows th i s  factor  w i l l  b e  r e f e r r e d  to, 
for  convenience, as t h e  "charge factor  ,I' 
The  e x t e n t  t o  which organic  po l lu t ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater decreased 
between 1969 and  1980 appears to  b e  re la ted t o  the  th ree  above-mentioned 
factors as fol lows: p roduc t i on  increase, r = -.21; abatement costs, r = .50;  
and charge factor, r = .73. T h e  s igns o f  these relat ions a re  a l l  in the 
anticipated d i rect ion.  T h e  s t r o n g  corre la t ion w i t h  the  charge factor  i s  v e r y  
s t r i k i ng .  When t h e  th ree  factors  a r e  related simultaneously t o  po l lu t ion 
decrease, t hey  account s ta t is t ica l ly  f o r  63 percen t  o f  t h e  decrease. T h e  
regression equation across the  14 major branches was estimated as: P = .33 
C - .32 AC - .01 Prod, R Z  = .63 where 
P = pe rcen t  decrease in d ischarge 1969-1980 
C = c h a r g e  factor  calculated as pol lu t ion ( i n  1000 PE) l iable t o  charges 
d i v i d e d  by tota l  p roduc t i on  va lue in mill ions o f  Du tch  gui lders in 
1969 
AC =estimated average cost o f  treatment p e r  b ranch  
Prod = p e r c e n t  change in o u t p u t  during 1969-1980 
The standard ized con t r i bu t i on  (beta) o f  t he  th ree  factors i s :  p roduc t i on  
increase, -0.30; abatement costs, -0.25; and  charge factor, 0.61. 
In the  case o f  two o f  t he  four teen indust r ies (potato-starch i n d u s t r y  and  
the stock-raising i n d u s t r y ) ,  charges had  less in f luence than  was t o  b e  
expected on  the  basis o f  t h e i r  charge factor. In anticipation o f  ult imately 
being hooked up t o  a "smeerpipe" ( l i tera l ly ,  a dirt pipe), t he  potato s tarch 
i n d u s t r y  h a d  been allowed t o  cont inue w i th  un t rea ted  discharges. D u r i n g  
th is  time, the  i n d u s t r y  was pay ing  much lower charge-rates than  were o the r  
indust r ies.  T h e  s tock-ra is ing i n d u s t r y  i s  composed o f  thousands o f  rela- 
t ive ly  small farms. Here t h e  charges a re  seldom calculated exact ly  on  t h e  
basis o f  t h e  amount o f  po l lu t ion actual ly  produced. Hence it is t o  b e  
expected t h a t  t h e  impact o f  charges w i l l  p robab ly  b e  less in th i s  case than  
in o the r  i ndus t r i es  w i t h  a similar charge factor .  When these two indus t r i es  
are l e f t  ou t  o f  t h e  analysis, t h e  corre la t ion o f  t h e  charge factor  w i th  the  
decrease in po l l u t i on  is even s t ronger :  r = .84. T h e  corre la t ion w i t h  the  
other  two factors  remains about  the  same, w i t h  p roduc t i on  increase showing 
a r o f  -.24 and  abatement costs an  r o f  -.48. These th ree  factors, taken 
together, account f o r  76 percent  o f  t he  d i f ferences in the  decrease o f  
organic po l lu t ion in indus t r i a l  wastewater between these twelve indust r ies.  
Policy Ins t rumen ts  a n d  Regional Di f ferences 
in t h e  Decrease of Organic  Pollut ion 
A n  impor tant  p a r t  o f  t he  regional var ia t ion in pol lu t ion abatement cannot 
b e  expla ined by d i f ferences in the  i ndus t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he  regions. I f  
the  conclusion o f  t h e  above section i s  correct, t h i s  le f tover  var ia t ion can b e  
explained en t i re l y  in terms o f  t h e  degree t o  wh ich  d i f f e r e n t  po l icy  i n s t r u -  
ments a re  being used. T h e  degree t o  which these d i f f e r e n t  inst ruments a re  
actual ly used wi l l  also v a r y  g rea t l y  f rom region to  region. In t h i s  section, 
we wil l  examine the  e x t e n t  t o  which t h i s  explanation is accurate. 
As in the  discussion of the  a l ternat ive explanations o f  po l lu t ion decline, 
po l icy  inst ruments can also b e  g rouped  in terms o f  factors tha t  inf luence 
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decision making by subject ive ly  ra t ional  actors.6 A l l  ins t ruments mentioned 
a r e  used simultaneously in Du tch  water qua l i t y  pol icy. 
As can b e  seen in F i g u r e  3 ,  proh ib i t i ons  have no t  been l i nked  w i th  
reduc ing  t h e  number o f  behavioral a l ternat ives avai lable t o  the  decision 
maker. A l though  th i s  would appear t o  b e  the  aim o f  such direct ives, i t  
would b e  unreal is t ic  t o  assume tha t  t hey  a re  always successful in th i s  
regard.  What e f fect  p roh ib i t i ons  in fact  have  upon  behavior  w i l l  have t o  b e  
establ ished empir ical ly f o r  a g i v e n  situation. 
F i g u r e  3 
I n v e n t o r y  of Types of P o l i c y  Ins t rumen ts  
Fac to r  i n  d e c i s i o n  model Type of p o l i c y  i ns t rumen t  
1. new b e h a v i o r a l  a1 t e r n a t i v e s  a. p romot ion  o f  t e c h n i c a l  know-how develop- 
ment 
9 .  fewer a l t e r n a t i v e s  
3. change i n  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  b.  d i r e c t i v e s  1 ( p e r m i t s  and p r o h i b i t i o n s )  
c. d i r e c t i v e s  2 ( i n s p e c t i o n  and t h e  c o u r t s )  
d. i n c e n t i v e s  ( e f f l u e n t  charges) 
4. change i n  v a l u a t i o n  of p r o p e r t i e s  o f  e. d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  pe rsuas ion  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h o u t  s p e c i f i c  l e g a l  grounds 
5. i n f o r m a t i o n  on presence and p r o p e r t i e s  f. adv i ce  t o  companies about p r o p e r t i e s  o f  
o f  a1 t e r n a t i v e s  e x i s t i n g  abatement techniques 
Since we a re  pa r t i cu la r l y  in terested in e f f l uen t  charges and  since, o n  
the basis o f  t he  b ranch  analysis above, we expect t o  find a clear impact o f  
charges on  decisions a f fec t i ng  the  amount o f  pol lut ion, we wi l l  examine the  
impact o f  t h i s  inst rument  f i r s t  and  then  look a t  t he  o the r  inst ruments.  
The  dependent var iab le f o r  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t he  analysis is t he  " re la t ive 
success o f  abatement ." T h i s  var iab le has been calculated as the  d i f ference 
between the  actual pe rcen t  o f  abatement and  the  percent  o f  abatement 
expected in view o f  t he  i ndus t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he  region. Regional va r i -  
a t ion in the  charge level cannot, however, s t ra igh t fo rward l y  b e  related t o  
th i s  variable. T h e  reason f o r  t h i s  is as follows. 
T h e  re la t i ve  success o f  abatement has been calculated f o r  t he  per iod 
1975-1980. P r io r  t o  t h i s  time, however, po l lu t ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater 
had  a l ready decl ined substant ia l ly .  O u r  analysis o f  i n t e r i n d u s t r y  var ia t ions 
(see above) makes it p laus ib le  t o  assume tha t  abatement in t h i s  pe r iod  was 
also l a rge ly  the  resu l t  o f  charges. T h e  1975 amount o f  po l lu t ion was al- 
ready more o r  less in equi l ibr ium w i t h  the  charge level o f  t ha t  time. For  
t h i s  reason, the  charge factor  in f luenc ing the  abatement o f  po l lu t ion o f  
i ndus t r i a l  wastewater is ind icated much be t te r  by the d i f ference between the  
ra te  before 1975 and  t h e  ra te  a t  t h e  end  o f  t h e  pe r iod  1975-1980 t h a n  by 
t h e  level o f  t he  charge in any  one o f  t he  preceding years. 
However, it cannot b e  determined o n  theoretical g rounds  f o r  which 
per iod the  charge increase should b e  used as independent variable. O n  the  
one hand, the re  i s  a time-lag between the  st imulus t o  abatement e f fo r t s  and  
t h e  insta l la t ion and  putting i n t o  operation o f  t he  re levant  cont ro l  measures. 
On  the  o the r  hand, it is no t  implausible t o  expect a cer ta in  degree o f  
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ant ic ipat ion by the  companies t o  charges and  ra te  increases (Bressers, 
1983-2; Ewringmann, Kibat, Schafhausen, Fedderson, Kr icke l ,  Perdelwitz, & 
Strauss, 1980). It i s  bet ter ,  therefore, t o  decide o n  empir ical g rounds  
which pe r iod  should b e  considered in determin ing the ra te  increase. Th is  
per iod s t a r t s  in t h e  year  in which t h e  ra te  o f  t he  charge has the  h ighest  
negative corre la t ion w i t h  the  re la t ive success o f  abatement between 1975 and  
1980. T h e  r a t e  in tha t  year  can b e  taken as t h e  best ind icator  f o r  t h e  
extent  t o  which abatement e f fo r t s  before 1975 negat ive ly  affected abatement 
act iv i t ies  in t h e  subsequent per iod by the  resu l t i ng  increase o f  marginal 
costs o f  f u r t h e r  abatement. T h e  ra te  charged in tha t  year should then  b e  
subtracted f rom t h e  charge a t  t he  end  o f  t he  pe r iod  w i th  the  h ighest  posi- 
t i ve  corre la t ion in o r d e r  t o  ge t  t he  best  possible ind icator  o f  t he  charge 
factor t ha t  st imulated abatement o f  po l lu t ion in t h e  1975-1980 period. 
As expected, t h e  level o f  t h e  cha rge  p r i o r  a round  1975 is negat ive ly  
corre la ted w i t h  t h e  re la t i ve  success o f  abatement o f  organic  po l lu t ion o f  
i ndus t r i a l  wastewater in the  years 1975-1980. T h i s  negative relat ionship i s  
s t rongest  w i t h  the  1974 charge ( r  = -.53). T h e  correlat ions gradual ly  
become more pos i t i ve  up t o  and  inc lud ing  1980. The  1980 ra te  o f  charge 
shows a clear pos i t ive corre la t ion w i t h  re la t i ve  abatement success ( r  = 
+.53). As an  ind icator  f o r  t h e  in f luence o f  e f f l uen t  charge on  re la t ive 
abatement success, we will, therefore, t ake  t h e  increase in the ra te  charged 
in the  pe r iod  1974-1980. Fo r  two o f  t he  17 water d i s t r i c t s  examined th i s  
indicator could no t  b e  calculated. 
The  increase in the  ra te  charged in the  pe r iod  1974-1980 has a v e r y  
s t rong pos i t ive corre la t ion w i t h  the  re la t ive abatement success fo r  the years 
between 1975 and  1980 ( r  = +.86, n = 15, p = .OOO). T h i s  relat ion is no t  
the resu l t  o f  one o r  two extreme values fo r  t he  un i t s  analyzed, a l though 
the two water qua l i t y  d i s t r i c t s  w i t h  respect ive ly  the  most and  the  least 
relat ive success weaken the  s t r e n g t h  o f  t he  relat ionship somewhat. Without 
these two observations the  corre la t ion i s  even s t ronger :  r = +.92 ( n  = 13, 
p = .OOO). F u r t h e r  analysis has showed tha t  t h i s  corre la t ion cannot b e  
a t t r i bu ted  t o  water author i t ies  react ing on  abatement e f fo r  s by i n d u s t r y  by 
ra is ing cha rge  rates to  keep the  same amount of revenues. 
W i t h  such high correlat ions between the  charge factor  and  t h e  pol lu t ion 
decrease it i s  na tu ra l  t ha t  t h e  relat ionships w i t h  t h e  ind icators  o f  t he  g rea t  
var ie ty  o f  o the r  po l icy  inst ruments used are absent o r  on l y  weak. Among 
al l  these indicators, on l y  water boa rd  permi t -g iv ing t o  municipal i t ies and  
abatement schemes show up w i t h  re la t ive ly  substant ia l  but s t i l l  modest 
pos i t ive correlat ions w i th  the  re la t ive abatement success. 
The  re la t ive abatement success, t he  dependent variable in a l l  these 
analyses, has been def ined as the  percentage decrease o f  oxygen-consuming 
pol lu t ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater, corrected to  take the  regional s t r u c t u r e  
o f  i n d u s t r y  i n t o  account. It should, therefore, b e  possible t o  expla in  the  
variat ion in t h e  percentage decrease o f  organic  po l lu t ion by: (a) the de- 
crease t o  b e  expected as a resu l t  o f  d i f ferences in the  regional s t r u c t u r e  o f  
i ndus t r y ;  ( b )  t h e  increase in the  ra te  charged; ( c )  t he  number o f  munici- 
palit ies w i t h  a permi t  issued by water boards ( thus  giving these author i t ies  
i nd i rec t  in f luence o n  sewage permi ts  issued t o  ind iv idual  p lants)  ; ( d )  the 
weighted number o f  abatement plans. 
As  it t u r n s  out, 96 percent  o f  t he  percentage decrease o f  organic  water 
po l lu t ion can b e  explained, stat ist ical ly, by the  f i r s t  two factors ( R 2  a f t e r  
correct ion i s  .95). Ninety-e ight  p e r  cent  can b e  explained by a l l  f ou r  
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factors  taken together, but t h i s  i s  due mainly to  t h e  fact  t h a t  one research 
unit has been d ropped  f rom the  calculat ion. I f  we take t h i s  smaller g r o u p  
o f  1 4  un i ts ,  t he  two f i rs t -named factors  expla in  97 pe rcen t  o f  t he  d i f f e r -  
ences in pol lu t ion decrease. 
T h e  regress ion formula used t o  expla in  96 pe rcen t  o f  t he  d i f ference in 
po l l u t i on  decrease is :  
y = 0 . 9 6 ~ 1  +1.55x2 - 35.6 (constant )  R Z  = .96, n = 15. 
(0.08) (0.20) 
Where 
y = pe rcen t  decrease o f  t he  pol lu t ion o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater 
x l  = pe rcen t  decrease t o  b e  expected on  the  basis o f  t he  regional 
x2 = increase in the  r a t e  charged 1974-1980 ( i n  Du tch  gui lders)  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n d u s t r y  
In b racke ts  t h e  s tandard e r ro rs .  T h i s  means tha t  one percent  o f  actual 
abatement corresponds t o  approximately one pe rcen t  abatement t o  b e  expect- 
ed o n  the  basis o f  t h e  regional s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n d u s t r y  (wh ich  is an  ind icat ion 
tha t  t h e  calculat ion i s  no t  d i s to r ted )  a n d  w i th  an  increase in ra te  o f  1.5. 
Policy Inst ruments and  Regional Di f ferences 
in Decrease in Heavy Metal Pol lu t ion 
Two  water boards do  no t  impose e f f l uen t  charges o n  heavy metal po l lu t -  
ers .  T h e i r  resu l t s  a re  n o t  much d i f f e r e n t  f rom those o f  t he  o the r  d i s t r i c t s .  
However, as a matter o f  fact, in t h e i r  negotiat ions w i t h  i n d u s t r y ,  when 
demanding qu i te  substant ia l  reduct ions in pol lu t ion level, these boards did 
use t h e  poss ib i l i ty  o f  i n t roduc ing  e f f l uen t  charges as threat .  In th i s  
sense, t h e i r  effect iveness in achiev ing decreases in heavy metal po l lu t ion i s  
no t  to ta l ly  independent o f  t he  e f f l uen t  charge system. We wil l  no t  inc lude 
these d i s t r i c t s  in the  fol lowing analysis. 
T h e  ind icators  fo r  po l icy  ou tpu ts  used he re  are, f o r  t he  most p a r t ,  t he  
same as those used in looking at  organic  po l lu t ion o r  t hey  have been calcu- 
lated in a similar manner. T h e  ind icators  fo r  permi ts  issued and  f o r  tech- 
nology, advice and  informal negotiat ions a re  d i f f e ren t .  T h e  ind icator  f o r  
permi ts  has been calculated as the  pe rcen t  o f  companies tha t  d ischarge a 
taxable amount o f  heavy metals hav ing  a permi t  t ha t  st ipulates condit ions 
fo r  these discharges in 1975, the  pe rcen t  w i t h  such permi ts  in 1980, and  
t h e  increase in these numbers between 1975 and  1980. Technology develop- 
ment, advice and  information negotiat ions a re  also indicated by the  p ropor -  
t i on  o f  major d ischargers contacted instead o f  by the  weighted number. 
T h e  increase o f  t h e  charge ra te  in t h e  pe r iod  1975-1980 is c lear ly  re la ted 
to  the  re la t i ve  success o f  t h e  abatement o f  heavy metal po l lu t ion of indus- 
t r i a l  wastewater, a l though t h e  re la t ionship i s  no t  as ev ident  as w i t h  the  
abatement o f  organic  po l lu t ion.  T h e  r = .65, f o r  an  n = 13 and  a p = .008. 
Among the  o the r  ind icators  o f  t h e  inst ruments used weighted number o f  
formal repo r t s  by pol lu t ion inspectors  and  t h e  p ropor t i on  o f  companies w i t h  
which an  abatement p lan was d r a w n  up were pos i t ive ly  corre la ted w i t h  the 
re la t ive abatement success w i t h  heavy metal po l lu t ion.  
The  weighted number o f  inspectors  t u r n s  ou t  not  t o  b e  related to  abate- 
ment success. T h e  same goes fo r  b o t h  t h e  number o f  in f r ingements detect- 
ed b y  them (as a n  ind icator  of t h e i r  ac t i v i t y )  and  t h e  number o f  t imes they 
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threatened of f ic ia l  enforcement actions. However, t he  s i tuat ion is d i f f e ren t  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  number o f  times these inspectors  in fact o f f ic ia l ly  r e p o r t  
such in f r ingements and  use the  police t o  enforce compliance. T h e  weighted 
number o f  formal repo r t s  i s  pos i t ive ly  re la ted t o  the  re la t ive abatement 
success (r = .30, n = 14, n.s.).  I f we take the  ra te  o f  increase f o r  e f f lu-  
ent  charges i n t o  account, t he  corre la t ion i s  even s t ronger  ( p r  = .43, n = 
13, p = .082). 
The  p ropor t i on  o f  companies w i t h  which an  abatement p lan  was d rawn  up 
is c lear ly  re la ted t o  the  re la t i ve  abatement success. A l though  th i s  re la t ion 
is at f i r s t  re la t ive ly  weak ( r  = .30, n = 14, r1.s.) if we take i n t o  account 
the in f luence o f  t h e  increase o f  ra te  charges, t h e  corre la t ion i s  s t ronger  
( p r  = .55, n = 13, p = .031). 
The  p ropor t i on  o f  companies w i t h  which an  abatement p lan was d r a w n  up 
is c lear ly  related t o  the  re la t ive abatement success. A l though  th i s  relat ion 
is a t  f i r s t  re la t ive ly  weak ( r  = .30, n = 14, n.s.) i f  we take i n t o  account 
the in f luence of t h e  increase o f  ra te  charges, t he  corre la t ion i s  s t ronger  
( p r  = .55, n = 13, p = .031). 
The  combination o f  po l icy  ou tpu ts  t h a t  accounts f o r  t h e  greatest  p a r t  o f  
the var ia t ion in re la t i ve  success in abat ing pol lu t ion by heavy metals in- 
cludes ( a f t e r  a correct ion f o r  t h e  number o f  independent var iab les) :  
- t h e  increase in t h e  charge r a t e  1975-1980; 
- the  p ropor t i on  o f  heavy metal d ischargers w i t h  an  abatement plan; 
- the  weighted number o f  o f f ic ia l  repo r t s  on  noncompliance. 
Together  these pol icy  ou tpu ts  expla in  s tat is t ica l ly  82 percent  o f  t h e  
dif ference in re la t i ve  abatement success. These th ree  pol icy  ou tpu ts  to- 
gether w i t h  t h e  abatement tha t  could have been expected in view o f  t h e  
regional s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n d u s t r y  and  the  shares o f  t he  var ious k i n d s  o f  metal 
stat ist ical ly account f o r  91 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  var ia t ion in decrease in heavy 
metal po l lu t ion (Rz a f te r  correct ion i s  .87). 
The  s tandard ized con t r i bu t i on  (beta) o f  t he  d i f f e ren t  factors  to t h i s  are:  
x - abatement expected ( % )  .33 
x1  - increase in r a t e  charged ( i n  gu i lders)  




x2 - p ropor t i on  o f  companies w i t h  abatement p lan  (5) 
4 
The regress ion equation i t se l f  r u n s  as follows: 
y = 0.73~ + 3 . 3 5 ~  t 0 . 4 2 ~  i 6 . 2 4 ~  = 78.1 
RZ = 0.91, n = 14 ( I n  brackets, t he  s tandard e r r o r s )  
(0.301) (0.802) (0.11) (1.934 
Given tha t  B o f  x (charges) i s  more than  twice as high f o r  heavy metals 
as it was f o r  organic  pol lut ion, it can b e  concluded tha t  t he  re la t ive level 
o f  charges compared w i t h  abatement costs i s  much lower f o r  heavy metals 
than f o r  organic  pol lut ion. Fo r  most heavy metals, one ki logram i s  equal t o  
one populat ion equiva lent  o f  organic  pol lut ion. In general, t he  re la t ive ly  
low level o f  charges o n  heavy metals i s  acknowledged by t h a t  s ta f f  o f  t he  
water boards. In spi te  o f  this, t h e  charge appears to  p rov ide  the  p r imary  
impetus f o r  po l lu t ion abatement also in t h e  case o f  heavy metals. 
2 
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 2:  
AN EXPERT ASSESSMENT 
T h u s  f a r  t h ree  independent  stat ist ical analyses have shown tha t  e f f l uen t  
charges have been a q u i t e  ef fect ive inst rument  o f  Du tch  water qua l i t y  
po l icy .  T h e  con t r i bu t i on  o f  each o f  t h e  pol icy  inst ruments appl ied t o  the  
substant ia l  reduct ions o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater po l lu t ion in The  Netherlands 
can also b e  determined w i t h  the  he lp  o f  t he  assessments by ins iders.  In 
t h i s  section we w i l l  compare t h e  resu l t s  o f  t h e  s tat is t ica l  analysis w i t h  t h e  
assessment o f  exper t s  f rom b o t h  t h e  water boards and  i n d u s t r y  rega rd ing  
the  re la t ive effect iveness o f  these inst ruments.  Bo th  approaches have t h e i r  
s t rong  and  weak po in ts  (Reichardt  & Cook, 1979).  However, should bo th  
methods lead to the  same conclusion, o u r  confidence would b e  increased in 
t h e  re l i ab i l i t y  o f  t h i s  conclusion. As  was the  case w i t h  the  stat ist ical 
analysis, independent  analyses based on  d i f f e r e n t  sets o f  data were used: 
on  the  one hand, the  opinions o f  negotiators f rom the  water boards and, o n  
t h e  o the r  hand, representat ives o f  t h e  companies who were responsible fo r  
water qua l i t y .  
Assessment of Policy Ins t rumen t  by Policy lmplementors 
In a quest ionnai re sent t o  the  regional water boards, admin is t ra tors  were 
asked to  ind icate how much in f luence they  though t  the  var ious pol icy  in- 
st ruments had  on  t h e  abatement o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater po l lu t ion.  For  
b o t h  organic  po l lu t ion and  pol lu t ion w i t h  heavy metals the  respondents could 
choose f rom f i v e  answers. T h e  category "Not  appl ied" could b e  checked to  
ind icate t h a t  a pa r t i cu la r  i ns t rumen t  had  no t  been used w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  tha t  
t y p e  o f  po l lu t ion.  In practice, "No answer" also near ly  always indicated 
the  inst rument  in quest ion had  no t  been used a t  al l  o r  v e r y  l i t t l e .  T h i s  
was the  case fo r  t he  seven smaller water author i t ies  tha t  did no t  fill in the  
questionnaire completely, adding such comments as "no experience" and  the  
l ike.  Regard ing heavy metals, t he  quest ion was i r re levan t  f o r  seventeen 
smaller water boards since the re  were no companies in t h e i r  areas known to  
d ischarge heavy metals. Table 1 shows the  answers g i ven  to  th i s  question. 
In general these resu l t s  correspond w i t h  those o f  t h e  stat ist ical analy- 
ses, a t  least as f a r  as the  main points  are concerned. Charges emerge as 
the  most in f luent ia l  po l icy  inst rument  f o r  deal ing w i t h  organic  pol lut ion, 
whereas in the case o f  heavy metals we see t h a t  t he  respondents a t t r i bu ted  
equal amounts o f  in f luence t o  a broader  range o f  inst ruments.  There  are, 
however, some small but in te res t i ng  d i f ferences between the  resul ts  o f  t he  
quest ionnai re and  those o f  t h e  stat ist ical analyses. 
Acco rd ing  t o  the  stat ist ical analysis, charges also p layed the  most impor- 
t a n t  ro le  in decreasing heavy metals pol lut ion, a l though t o  a lesser degree 
than  was t h e  case w i t h  oxygen-consuming pol lut ion. Why was it tha t  t h e  
regional water qua l i t y  admin is t ra tors  recognized the  importance o f  charges 
fo r  t he  abatement o f  organic  pol lut ion, but n o t  f o r  decreasing pol lu t ion w i th  
heavy metals? T h e  explanation seems t o  be tha t  these off icials can c lear ly  
see t h a t  t he re  a re  companies tha t  a re  go ing t o  abate organic  po l lu t ion 
because o f  charges, but h a r d l y  any  companies a r e  going t o  abate t h e i r  
heavy metal po l lu t ion solely because o f  t he  e f f l uen t  charges. Discharg ing 
heavy metals i s  simply too cheap. Abatement plans and  inspections are 
almost always necessary t o  persuade heavy-metal po l lu ters  t o  take appro- 
p r i a t e  action. What these water qua l i t y  admin is t ra tors  d o  not  see (indeed, 
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what t h e y  i nd i v idua l l y  cannot see) is t ha t  t he  success o f  these abatement 
plans is much g rea te r  in d i s t r i c t s  where charges were increased than  in 
other areas. In b o t h  cases, companies have to b e  persuaded by the  water 
author i t ies  t o  ge t  started; in some cases, however, off icials must cont inue 
to  e x e r t  p ressu re  t o  ensure tha t  t he  agreed-upon measures a re  in fact  
carr ied out .  Even when t h e y  cannot in themselves motivate companies to  
take abatement action, charges apparent ly  p lay  an  impor tant  ro le  in faci l i -  
ta t ing the  task o f  t h e  water qua l i t y  administrators in g e t t i n g  abatement 
measures implemented. T h i s  conclusion opens in te res t i ng  perspect ives o n  
the poss ib i l i ty  o f  app ly ing  charges no t  on l y  as an  a l ternat ive for, but also 
as a complement t o  d i r e c t  regulat ion. 
Table 1 
Assessment by Regional Water Oual i t y  Admin is t ra to rs  of 
t h e  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  P o l i c y  Instruments 
Type o f  
P o l i c y  Instrument P o l l u t i o n  
a. Permi ts  Organic 
Heavy metals 
b. Inspec t ion  and t h e  c o u r t s  Organic 
Heavy meta ls  
c. E f f l u e n t  charges Organic 
Heavy metals 
d. Promotion o f  techno log ica l  Organic 
developments Heavy metals 
e. Advice Orgdnic 
Heavy metals 
f .  Informal n e g o t i a t i o n s  Organic 
Heavy metals 
Extent o f  In f luence # - 
++ ++ + 
t+ + + 
2 12 14 
5 0 0  
1 16 13 
2 10 10 
16 14 3 
1 9 9  
0 3 14 
1 2 12 
3 9 14 
2 7 70 
5 15 11 
4 5 12 
+ o  
3 2  7 
0 2 17 
2 1 7  
1 0 17 
0 0 7  
2 2 17 
12 4 7 
5 3 17 
6 1 7  
2 2 17 
2 0 7  
2 0 17 













Another  p o i n t  ca l l ing f o r  a t tent ion i s  t h e  ro le  p layed by informal negoti- 
ations. It i s  clear f rom t h e  questionnaire than  water boa rd  off icials at- 
tached g rea te r  importance t o  t h i s  inst rument  tha t  we would have anticipated 
on  t h e  basis o f  t h e  s tat is t ica l  analysis. It appears tha t  t h i s  apparent  
discrepancy can b e  accounted for by the  fact  t ha t  negotiat ions d o  not  
const i tu te  a separate inst rument  in addi t ion to  other  po l icy  instruments, but 
rather  represent  a manner in which t h e  total "po l icy  mix" i s  applied. In 
th is  rega rd  the re  a re  two in te res t i ng  aspects o f  informal negotiations. In 
the f i r s t  place, t hey  serve as a so r t  o f  " lubr icant"  t o  o i l  t h e  machinery put 
in to  operat ion by t h e  o the r  po l icy  inst ruments discussed above (compare f o r  
Germany: Hucke, 1978; and  f o r  Great B r i t a in :  Vogel, 1983, pp. 1 -2 ) .  The  
fol lowing statement by a water boa rd  of f ic ia l  during one o f  the  ora l  i n te r -  
views t h a t  followed t h e  w r i t t e n  quest ionnai re i s  i l l us t ra t i ve  o f  t h i s  funct ion:  
"When I'm going t o  have a ta lk  w i th  a company about the  abatement o f  t he i r  
discharges, I always take my pocket calculator along. I calculate t h e i r  
potential sav ings o n  charges and  inva r iab l y  ge t  a n  i n te res t i ng  conversation 
started. I( 
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This ,  p r imar i l y  informative, funct ion o f  negotiat ions i s  especially impor- 
t an t  when o the r  circumstances and  the  pol icy  inst ruments appl ied have  an  
in f luence s t r o n g  enough t o  make abatement seem worthwhi le  t o  the  compa- 
nies t o  beg in  w i th .  T h i s  s i tuat ion w i l l  t end  t o  occur  more o f ten  in the  case 
o f  organic  po l lu t ion than  w i t h  heavy metals. T h e  implementation process 
w i th  r e g a r d  t o  organic  waste matter i s  characterized by re la t ive ly  small 
d i f ferences o f  op in ion between admin is t ra tors  and  companies rega rd ing  t h e  
amount o f  abatement aimed at .  T h i s  i s  due t o  the  p ressu re  o f  t he  e f f l uen t  
charges, which make reduct ions o f  discharges economically a t t ract ive.  
Heavy metals negotiat ions not on ly  fulfill an  in format ive function; h e r e  
they  also represents  t h e  way in which power i s  wielded. T h i s  s t ra tegy  
ref lects  the  fact  t h a t  in such cases the re  a re  o f ten  q u i t e  substantial d i f f e r -  
ences o f  op in ion between water qua l i t y  admin is t ra tors  and  t h e  companies 
rega rd ing  the  des i rab le amount o f  f u r t h e r  d ischarge reduction. In these 
s i tuat ions t h e  balance o f  power i s  such tha t  ne i ther  p a r t y  is in a pos i t ion t o  
impose i t s  w i l l  upon  the  o the r .  It appears then  tha t  unless the admin is t ra tor  
i s  in a pos i t ion t o  e x e r t  enough power and  t o  app ly  a po l icy  inst rument  
vis-a-vis the  company so t h a t  h e  can achieve h i s  abatement goals wi thout  
delay, it i s  q u i t e  rat ional f o r  h im t o  app ly  the  avai lable po l icy  inst ruments 
selectively w i th in  a framework o f  de l iberat ion and  negotiat ion w i th  i n d u s t r y .  
T h e  Assessment o f  Pol icy Inst ruments by the  Regulated Indus t r i es  
In addi t ion t o  the  analyses mentioned above, we also made use o f  a 
s t u d y  by two D u t c h  f iscal lawyers, Schuurman and  Tegelaar (1983). T h i s  
s tudy ,  based o n  the  subject ive assessments o f  company off icials d i r e c t l y  
i nvo l ved  w i t h  po l lu t ion abatement, was based o n  150 f i rms  cons t i t u t i ng  
one- f i f th  of t h e  category " l a rge  pol luters." T h e  data were collected in 
in te rv iews  w i th  one o r  more funct ionar ies a t  t h e  s ta f f  o r  execut ive level who 
were responsible fo r  company pol icy  w i t h  rega rd  to  water po l lu t ion o r  who 
were closely invo lved in the  implementation o f  these policies. In general, 
these of f ic ia ls  can b e  considered the  conversation pa r tne rs  o f  the respond- 
ents  from the  preceding analysis o f  t he  water boa rd  administrators. 
The  resul ts  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  show c lear ly  t h a t  in t h e  per iod 1975-1980 
e f f l uen t  charges had  a substant ia l  e f fect  on  the  abatement o f  po l lu t ion by 
the  companies invest igated.  F o r  nea r l y  60 percent  o f  t he  companies i n te r -  
viewed, t h e  charge lev ied was the  decisive factor  in the  decision t o  take 
abatement measures. T h e  pol lu t ion decrease real ized by these measures 
amounted t o  more than  3.2 mil l ion populat ion equivalents ou t  o f  a total 
reduc t i on  o f  po l lu t ion o f  4 mil l ion PEs. T h i s  means tha t  80 percent  of 
po l lu t ion abatement real ized in the  pe r iod  1975-1980 can, according t o  the 
companies investigated, b e  explained in terms o f  t he  f irms' response t o  the  
e f f l uen t  charge, w i t h  the  remaining 20 p e r  cent  a t t r i bu tab le  t o  o the r  fac- 
tors .  T h e  most impor tant  noncharge inst rument  mentioned a r e  the  d is-  
cha rge  condi t ions contained in t h e  permits. Fo r  more than  20 percen t  of 
t he  f i rms  s tud ied t h i s  factor  was g i v e n  as the  immediate reason f o r  t a k i n g  
abatement measures. T h e  pol lu t ion decrease real ized by these measures, 
however, amounted a t  most t o  800,000 PEs. Accord ing t o  the  company 
of f ic ia ls  interviewed, it is expected t h a t  charges wi l l  also be an  impor tant  
reason f o r  t ak ing  f u r t h e r  abatement measures. 
In t h i s  analysis, charges once again emerge as by fa r  t he  most in f luent ia l  
ins t rument ,  but somewhat less dominating w i th  rega rd  t o  organic wastewater 
po l lu t ion than  in the  stat ist ical analysis. Two factors should, however, b e  
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kep t  in mind when comparing these two analyses. F i r s t  of al!, t he re  seems 
to b e  a ce r ta in  tendency in ora l  in terv iews t o  g i v e  the  socially desirable 
answer tha t  something i s  be ing done f o r  environmental protection, no t  be- 
cause it i s  cheaper but because one has a social responsib i l i ty  t o  do  it, o r  
because the  democratical ly elected author i t ies  have asked f o r  it. T h i s  wi l l  
lead t o  a ce r ta in  underestimation o f  t he  in f luence o f  charges on  abatement 
actions. Secondly, charges also can p lay  a n  impor tant  ro le  in cases where 
d ischarge regulat ions a r e  the  decisive motive f o r  measures taken. Without 
charge, t h e  d i f ference between demands made by water boards and  what 
i n d u s t r y  deems economically feasible would have been much greater  and, 
consequently, t h e  resistance o f  t he  f i rms  t o  these demands much st ronger .  
CONCLUSION 
Taken together  these analyses lead t o  the  remarkable conclusion tha t  t he  
substantial reduct ion o f  po l lu t ion o f  Du tch  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater between 
1975 and  1980 has been much more t h e  resu l t  o f  a po l icy  instrument, e f f lu-  
ent  charges, t ha t  was no t  o f f ic ia l ly  designed fo r  t h i s  purpose, t han  a resu l t  
o f  t he  use o f  t h e  pol icy  inst rument ,  d i r e c t  regulat ion, specif ical ly in tended 
to  achieve t h i s  objective. 
The  D u t c h  case, w i t h  t h e  most substantial system o f  e f f l uen t  charges in 
the world, shows the  enormous potential o f  t h i s  po l icy  inst rument .  In the 
research repo r ted  here, I did no t  come across any  evidence t h a t  would 
suggest t h a t  t h i s  resu l t  can b e  explained in terms o f  specif ic national 
characterist ics o f  T h e  Netherlands. Two  points, however, deserve attention. 
The  implementation o f  e f f l uen t  charges can be hampered by the  need f o r  
a devoted execut ive body t h a t  i s  determined t o  actual ly col lect the charges. 
Central government policies a re  o f ten  f r u s t r a t e d  by lack o f  cooperation by 
local author i t ies  appointed t o  implement them (Bressers E Honigh, 1986). 
Th is  problem did n o t  ar ise in Holland, thanks t o  the fact  t ha t  t he i r  e f f l uen t  
charges funct ion as so-called revenue ra i s ing  charges. T h r o u g h  the  charge 
system, the  water author i t ies  a re  col lect ing t h e i r  own money, needed v e r y  
much f o r  t h e  building and  explo i ta t ion of treatment plants, a task they  were 
eager to  under take.  
Another  major problem w i t h  e f f l uen t  charges i s  t h e  massive amount o f  
information tha t  i s  requ i red  to  assess the  fee each company has t o  pay.  
Some au tho rs  even see t h i s  as t h e  most impor tant  reason t o  d i sca rd  th i s  
pol icy inst rument  altogether. In Holland, t h i s  problem was reduced by no t  
charg ing the mill ions o f  households and  small i ndus t r i a l  po l lu ters  (less than  
10 PE) in p ropor t i on  t o  t h e  actual po l lu t ion t h e y  caused. Hav ing  re la t ive ly  
few oppor tun i t ies o f  l imi t ing pol lut ion, t h i s  category o f  po l lu ters  i s  o f  minor 
importance t o  the  inst rument 's  regu la t i ng  power. The  amount o f  information 
requ i red  i s  again substant ia l ly  reduced by basing the  assessment o f  medi- 
um-sized po l l u te rs  (usual ly  between 10 and  100 PE) no t  on  samples o f  t h e i r  
eff luent, but o n  a coeff icient table. O n  the  basis o f  easily obtainable data 
such as t h e  amount o f  water used by t h e  f i r m  o r  t h e  amount o f  ce r ta in  raw 
materials it processes w i t h  tha t  e x p e r t l y  calculated coeff icient table the  
probable amount o f  po l lu t ion can b e  establ ished accurately. However, t h e  
incent ive to  reduce pol lu t ion remains in tact .  Companies tha t  feel t hey  a re  
overrated on  the  coeff icient table can request  t h e i r  e f f l uen t  t o  b e  sam- 
p led and  t o  b e  charged o n  the  basis o f  t he  results. Not always th i s  leads 
to  permanent sampling. Sometimes on ly  a n  adjustment o f  t he  re levant  
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coeff icient is made. Al l  these pragmatic adjustments make it possible t o  
implement the charges a t  the  cost o f  on ly  a few percent  o f  the  total reve- 
nue, wi thout  diminishing substant ia l ly  the  instrument's regulat ing power (as 
could b e  shown). 
Implementation problems being solvable and the  way in which ef f luent  
charges inf luence the  negotiat ion process being consistent w i t h  what we 
would have been led  t o  expect by the  economics l i terature,  the greatest 
problem seems t o  be  the feas ib i l i ty  o f  in t roduc ing  such charges. In the 
words of Senator Domenici: "Charges have only  one problem: they lack 
pol i t ical suppor t "  (Domenici, 1982). Perhaps the  key  question is :  Who's 
a f ra id  o f  e f fect ive government? 
NOTES 
' A  populat ion equivalent is the amount o f  organic po l lu t ion equivalent t o  
the average organic po l lu t ion caused by one person in a normal household, 
which number o f  PEs is  therefore equal t o  the  populat ion. For  indus t r ia l  
po l lu t ion the number o f  PEs i s  predominantly calculated on basis o f  BOD 
and COD f igures.  
LThe publ icat ion o f  the s tudy  in 1983 had a substantial impact on the 
stance taken by t h e  Dutch  environmental ists and led t o  the  proposal in 
parliament t o  ex tend the  coverage o f  the charges. Time, however, has 
been no t  o n  the i r  side due t o  the most severe postwar economic c r is is  
Holland has experienced in recent years. 
3Data o f  low aggregation level were obtained from the task force for the  
preparat ion o f  the  " Ind icat ive Mult i-Year Program 1980-1984: The fight 
against water pol lut ion," M i n i s t r y  o f  Transpor t ,  Public Works and Water- 
affairs, 1981 (in par t i cu la r  data o n  pol lu t ion emissions) and from the Dutch  
Centra l  Stat ist ical Of f ice ( i n  par t i cu la r  par ts  o f  the branch data and the 
data o n  pr ices o f  heavy metals). 
4The fol lowing formula was used f o r  th is  calculation in the case o f  or -  
ganic pol lut ion; in the  case o f  heavy metal pol lut ion, a similar formula was 
used, expanded t o  take the  re la t ive shares o f  d i f fe ren t  metals in to  account. 
Pi exp.  = xl.bl + x b + ... + x .b 
2 i  2 ni n 
( i ' =  1 ....... m) 
Where 
P exp.  = expected percent  o f  decrease in pol lut ion o f  indust r ia l  
wastewater 1975-1980 
a l l  o ther  branches o f  i n d u s t r y  
b ranch in the regional economy in 1975. 
1 ... n = 7 branches: 6 highly pol lu t ing branches and one inc lud ing 
x l  ... n = the propor t ion  o f  po l lu t ion cont r ibu ted  by each indus t r ia l  
b l  ... n = p e r  cent  decrease in pol lut ion by each branch 
1 ... m = the  17 major water d is t r i c ts .  
5 
A more extended vers ion o f  th is  analysis can be  found in Bressers 
(1983, chap. 2). Methodological problems, especially those in connection 
w i t h  the  operationalization o f  the  re levant  theoretical notions t o  a model o f  
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analysis, a re  deal t  w i t h  the re  in greater  detai l .  Here we have l imited 
ourseIves t o  a s u r v e y  o f  f i nd ings  a n d  a ref lect ion o n  conclusions d r a w n  
from the  analysis. 
‘For t h e  purpose o f  effect iveness research, po l icy  inst ruments should 
p re fe rab ly  b e  classified on  t h e  basis of t h e  way in which they  inf luence and  
not  on  t h e  more usual basis o f  ex-ante estimates o f  t he  degree o f  coercion 
tha t  goes along w i t h  them (c f .  Nagel, 1 9 7 5 ) .  In t h e  l a t te r  t y p e  o f  classif i-  
cation, dependent and  independent variables ge t  mixed up. See fo r  an  
extended classif icat ion o f  po l i cy  inst ruments o n  t h e  basis o f  t h e i r  “modus 
operandi,” Bressers and  Klok ( i n  p ress ) .  
I 
T h e  seventeen areas analyzed he re  accounted fo r  near ly  a l l  water 
po l lu t ion in 1975 .  Nevertheless, t he re  a r e  ce r ta in  problems involved in 
d raw ing  conclusions based o n  the  stat ist ical analysis o f  seventeen cases. 
Th is  i s  especially so since a few scores a re  missing f o r  a number o f  inde- 
pendent variables so t ha t  t he  number o f  u n i t s  available fo r  analysis i s  
reduced even f u r t h e r .  Since we a r e  dealing w i t h  a semipopulation study, 
t he  danger  is pa r t i cu la r l y  g rea t  t ha t  one o r  more extreme values wi l l  de- 
termine t h e  d i rec t i on  and  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  correlat ions. In o rde r  t o  contro l  
for  th is ,  a p lo t  was made o f  each b ivar ia te re la t ion so t ha t  t he  possible 
inf luence o f  extreme values could b e  determined. As a matter o f  fact  t he  
scores o f  t h e  cases on  the  dependent and  the  independent variables spread 
ou t  q u i t e  normally, w i t h  no  real out layers and  some concentrat ion around 
the center  o f  t he  range. 
8We have calculated tha t  p a r t  o f  t he  ra te  increase between 1974 and  1980 
t ha t  was necessary to  p r e v e n t  t he  pol lu t ion abatement attained from resu l t -  
ing in a reduct ion in revenue from e f f l uen t  charges. T h i s  tu rned  ou t  t o  
range f rom 3 percen t  t o  20 percent  o f  t he  total increase ( 5 %  o n  t h e  aver- 
age). Next, t h i s  p a r t  o f  t he  ra te  increase was subtracted from the  total 
increase in the pe r iod  1974-80 so tha t  what remained was on ly  the  increase 
tha t  cannot b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h z  decrease in pol lut ion. The  remaining 
increase in ra tes charged was almost as s t rong ly  re la ted to t h e  re la t ive 
abatement success as was the  total increase: 4 = .83 ( n  = 15, p = , 0 0 0 ) .  
T h i s  seems t o  indicate tha t  t he  increase in charges i s  a cause r a t h e r  than  
an ef fect  o f  po l lu t ion abatement o f  i ndus t r i a l  wastewater. 
REFERENCES 
Bressers, H.Th.A. ( 1 9 8 3 ) .  The  ro le  o f  e f f l uen t  charges in Du tch  water 
qua l i t y  poticy. In Downing & Hanf (Eds.), International comparisons in 
implementing pollution laws (pp .  143-168) .  Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.  
Bressers, H.Th.A. & Honigh, M. (1986 ,  June) .  A comparative approach 
t o  the  explanation of po l icy  effects. International Social Science Journal. 
Bressers, H.Th.A. E Klok, P-J. ( i n  p ress ) .  Fundamentals for a theory of 
policy instruments, paper  In ternat ional  Congress on  environmental pol icy 
in a market  economy, Agr i cu l tu ra l  Un ive rs i t y  Wageningen ( for thcoming in 
International Journal of Social Economics) . 
Bressers, J .Th.A. ( 1 9 8 3 )  . Beleidseffectizliteit en waterkwaliteitsbeleid 
(Pol icy effect iveness and  water qua l i t y  po l icy) ,  dissertat ion. Enschede: 
U n i v e r  si t y o f  T wen t e  . 
518 Policy Studies  Review, Spring 1988, 7:3 
Bressers, J.Th.A. (1985). Milieu op de rnarkt (Environment on  the  mar- 
ke t ) ,  Amsterdam : Kobra. 
Brown, G.M.. J r .  & Johnson, R.W. (1983). The effluent charge system in 
the federal republic of Germany and i ts  potential application in the U S .  
Seatt le: U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Washington. 
Domenici, P.V. (1982, December). Emissions t rad ing :  T h e  subt le  heresy. 
The Environmental Forum. 
Ewringmann. D.K.K., Schafhausen, F.J., Fedderson, F., Kr icke l ,  W., 
Perdelwitz, D., E Strauss, W. (1980). Die Abwasserabgabe als fnves t i -  
tionsanreiz: Auswirkungen des  7a W H G  und des Abwasserab gabegezetzes 
auf Investions plariung und -abwicklung. B e r l i n  : Er i ch  Schmidt Verlag. 
Hennipman, P. (1945). Economisch motief en  economisch principe. Am- 
sterdam. 
Hoogerwerf, A. (1985). T h e  anatomy o f  col lect ive fa i lure in T h e  Nether-  
lands. In Patton (Ed.), Culture and evaluation (pp .  47-60). San 
Francisco-Washington-London: Jossey-Bass, 47-60. 
Hucke, J. (1978). Bargain ing in regu la t i ve  pol icy  implementation : T h e  
case o f  a i r  and  water po l lu t ion control.  Environmental Policy and Law 
Johnson, R.W., & Brown, G.M. (1976). Cleaning up Europe's waters: 
Economics, management, policies. Preager pub1 . 
Majone, G. (1976, Fall). Choice among policy inst ruments f o r  po l lu t ion 
contro l .  Policy Anulysis, 589-613. 
McSpadden-Wenner, L. (1978, Winter). Pol lut ion contro l  : Implementation 
a l ternat ives.  Policy Analysis, 47-65. 
Mi tn ick,  B.M. (1980). The political economy of regulation: Creating, 
designing and removing regulatory forms. New Y o r k :  Columbia Un ive r -  
s i t y  Press. 
Oates, W .E. (1983). Economic incentives for environmental management: 
The recent U S  experience. 
Nagel, S . S .  (1975). Incent ives f o r  compliance w i th  environmental law. In 
M i lb ra th  E lnscho (Eds.),  The politics of environmental policy (pp .  
74-94). Bever l y  H i l l s :  Sage. 
Olson, M. (1971, 1965). The logic of coZlective action: Public goods and 
the theory of groups.  
Rose-Ackerman, S .  (1977). Market  models f o r  water po l lu t ion contro l :  
The i r  s t r e n g t h  and  weaknesses. 
Reichardt, C.S., & Cook, T.D. (1979). Beyond qual i ta t ive versus quant i -  
t a t i ve  methods. In Cook E Reichardt  (Eds.),  Qualitative and quantita- 
tive methods in evaluation research (pp .  7-32). Bever l y  Hi l ls :  Sage. 
Schuurman, J., E Tegelaar, J. (1983). De regulerende werk ing  van  de  
ve ron t re in ig ingshe f f i ng  opperv iaktewateren:  Een kwant i f icer ing.  Week- 
blad V O O P  fiscaal recht (Fiscal Law Weekly) ,  529-550. 
Scriven, M. (1976). Maximizing t h e  power of causal investigations: The  
modus operandi  method. In Class (Ed.), Evaluation Studies Review 
Annual ( p p .  101-119). Bever l y  H i l l s :  Sage. 
Simon, H.A. (1955, Februa ry ) .  A behavioral model o f  rat ional choice. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88-106. 
Vogel, D. (1983). Cooperative regulat ion:  Environmental protect ion in the  
Un i ted  States and  Great B r i t a in .  Public Administration Bulletin, 65-78. 
White, L.J. (1976). E f f l uen t  charges as a faster  means o f  achieving 
pol lu t ion abatement. Public Policy, 111-125. 
(pp .  109-115). 
Un ive rs i t y  o f  Mary land.  
Cambridge, MA:  M I T  Press. 
Public Policy, 383-406. 
